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COMMENTS
BANKRUPTCY-FEDERAL EQUITABLE DOCTRINE NOT APPLICABLE
TO STATE STATUTES OF LIMITATION
In 1942 Central States Electric Corporation, incorporated un-
der the laws of Virginia, was reorganized under Chapter X of
the Bankruptcy Act. The reorganization trustees brought suit in
a federal district court of New York for an accounting and
damages against its officers and directors for alleged fraud
and mismanagement. Jurisdiction was attained by reason of the
Bankruptcy Act.1 The principal defense was a plea of the New
York statute of limitation, which had run prior to the ing of
the reorganization petition. The federal district court held that a
federal court is free in a non-diversity action to adopt federal
equitable principles when construing a state statute of limitation.
On appeal, held: reversed, one judge dissenting. The federal
court sitting in New York is required not only to apply the New
York statute of limitation but to apply it as interpreted by the
New York courts.2
The problem in the principal case originated in the fact that
the law of New York does not provide for the tolling of the appli-
cable statute of limitation because of concealment or domination. 3
This rule is inconsistent with the federal equitable principle
which prevents the running of the applicable statute in such con-
tingencies.' The federal equitable rule appears to be firmly rooted
in federal law where state or federal statutes of limitation are
to be applied 5 to causes of action arising under federal substan-
1. 52 STAT. 842 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 11 (1946).
2. Austrian v. Williams, 198 F.2d 697 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
909 (1952).
3. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. ACT § 11 provides that the only matters which suspend
the running of the limitation period are those "specifically prescribed" in the
Act itself. The specified exceptions do not include domination or control of
a corporation. In Pollack v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 266 App. Div. 118,
120, 41 N.Y.S.2d 225, 226 (1st Dept. 1943) the court stated, "The statute
begins to run from the date of the commission of each separate wrongful act
alleged in each cause of action regardless of the date of the discovery or of
the continuance V control by [the officers and directors of the corporation]."
4. Bailey v. Glover, 21 Wall. 342 (U.S. 1874).
5. From the time of the decision in Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610
(1895), it has been clear that when Congress creates a right of action with-
'ut specifying a period of limitation, federal courts will, in actions at law,
generally apply the state statute of limitation locally applicable to the
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tive law or where6 Congress has stipulated that a federal statute
of limitation is to be applied.7 It followed therefore, that the deci-
sive issue in the principal -ase was whether a federal court might
apply the above federal equitable principle in construing a state
statute of limitation when that statute was applied to a plenary,
equitable, non-diversity suit, based upon a state-created claim
brought under the permissive provisions of the Bankruptcy Act.8
In answering this question in the negative, the Court of Ap-
peals stated that their decision was directed by Section 29 (e) of
the Act.9 The court, in interpreting this section, was of the opin-
ion that the cause of action was state createdt 0 and that, even
though diversity jurisdiction was lacking, the intent of Congress
was to make state law applicable in this instance and to leave
uniformity in the administration of the Bankruptcy Act to be
secured by making the application of state law uniform. This
opinion appears to be in accord with prior decisions construing
the precursor sections of Section 29 (e),l" for there seems to be
implicit in those decisions the rule that the trustees could pursue
a cause of action provided the applicable state or federal statute
of limitation had not run prior to the bankruptcy proceeding. 12
same or to the most nearly similar state created right. Although such
statutes are not binding in suits in equity, a federal equity court will
usually be guided by them, and may follow them by analogy. Holmberg v.
Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946).
6. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946)t
7. Dabney v. Levy, 191 F.2d 201 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 887
(1951).
8. See note 1 supra.
9. 52 STAT. 849 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 29 (e) (1946) provides in part:
A receiver or trustee may, within two years subsequent to the date of
adjudication or within such further period of time as the Federal or
State law may permit, institute proceedings in behalf of the estate
upon any claim against which the period of limitation fixed by Federal or
State law had not expired at the time of the filing of the petition in
bankruptcy....
10. In National Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Co., 337 U.S. 582, 599 (1949) the
Court stated:
... The only way in which any law of the United States contributed
to the case [Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S. 642 (1947)] was in opening
the district courts to the trustee .... The fact that the congressional
power over bankruptey granted by Art. I could open the court to the
trustee does not mean that such suits arise under the laws of the United
States; but it does mean that Art. I can supply a source of judicial power
for their adjudication. The distinction is important....
11. 14 STAT. 518 (1867); 30 STAT. 549 (1898), 11 U.S.C. § 29 (d) (1934),
as amended, 52 STAT. 849 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 29 (e) (1946).
12. See Isaacs v. Neece, 75 F.2d 566, 569 (5th Cir. 1935); Garland v.
Arrowood, 172 N.C. 591, 593, 90 S.E. 766, 767 (1916); Fuller v. Rock, 125
Ohio 36, 44, 180 N.E. 367, 369 (1932).
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The Act of 1867,13 moreover, expressly provided that all rights
of action barred upon the appointment of an assignee remained
barred.1'
In his dissent, Judge Clark appeared to be of the opinion that
the court was applying the rationale of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,15
and was thus unwittingly sanctioning an extension of that doc-
trine to include state created actions authorized by Congress to
be pursued in federal courts wh.ere diversity of citizenship was
lacking.6 He was of the belief that there was nothing in the
Erie doctrine which compelled the court's decision and that the
application of the Erie rule to the trustees' case operated disad-
vantageously from the point of view of nationwide uniformity.
The majority, however, applied Erie R.R. v. Tompkins only by
way of analogy and in the final analysis grounded its decision
upon a strict statutory construction. Furthermore, it intimated
that it would have reached the same result if it had been called
to rule upon these facts before the Erie Case. 7
The analogy drawn by the court to the Erie case was not
wholly inappropriate, however, and as it pointed out in its
opinion, the absence of diversity jurisdiction did not alone pre-
clude a result similar to that which would have been reached if
there had been such jurisdiction. It is well settled that concurrent
federal jurisdiction in diverse citizenship cases is for the purpose
of providing the parties with a federal forum in which to litigate
because of the presumed prejudice against the stranger litigant
in the courts of a state. 8 Where such jurisdiction exists, state
and not federal substantive law, under the Erie doctrine, must be
applied 19 and the conflict of laws rule of the state in which the
court resides governs. 20 State statutes of limitation, whether re-
garded as having procedural or substantive effect are binding on
federal courts, sitting in equity or at law, where the rights pur-
sued in the federal courts are granted by the state.21 The result
13. 14 STAT. 518 (1867).
14. Freelander v. Holloman, 9 Fed. Cas. 748, No. 5,081 (S.D. Miss. 1873).
15. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
16. See Austrian v. Williams, 198 F.2d 697, 702 ( d Cir. 1952) (dissent-
ing opinion).
17. Austrian v. Williams, 198 F.2d 697 n.6 (2d Cir. 1952).
18. DoBnI, FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 63 (1928).
19. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
20. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
21. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); Bergeron v. Man-
sour, 152 F.2d 27, 28 (1st Cir. 1945).
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of this approach has been that the federal courts have been sub-
ordinated to the state courts to the extent that the parties' rights
could neither be extended nor diminished by the application of
what has been called federal common law.
2 2
In a prior decision in the same case, solely on the question of
jurisdiction, the United States Supreme Court held that even
though diversity of citizenship or other usual ground for federal
jurisdiction was lacking, Section 2 of the Bankruptcy Act 24
granted federal district courts jurisdiction to hear plenary suits
brought by a Chapter X trustee. Chief Justice Vinson in deliver-
ing the opinion of the Court seemed to indicate that jurisdiction
was granted for the purpose of providing a choice of a forum in
which to litigate plenary suits, which is similar to the reason
for federal jurisdiction in diversity cases. Under this rationale
it would seem to follow therefore, that the federal court would
be sitting as another court of the state and bound to apply state
law just as if there were diversity jurisdiction, which in effect
is the analogy to the Erie rationale as drawn by the majority in
the principal case.
In the earlier case, Justice Frankfurter dissented and argued
that if federal jurisdiction were to be extended to the Chapter X
trustee, that jurisdiction would be exclusive rather than con-
current.25 There is nothing in the Act to indicate that the federal
court's plenary jurisdiction is exclusive, and without such a pro-
vision it is doubtful that it could be so considered. 2 Regardless
of the validity of Justice Frankfurter's contention, however, it
would appear necessary to adopt that contention in order to ac-
complish the uniformity urged by Judge Clark in his dissent in
the principal case. Even this, however, would lead to a highly
anomalous situation where the trustee, having only the rights
which the estate had prior to reorganization proceedings, 27 could
22. E.g., Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
23. Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S. 642 (1947).
24. See note 1 supra.
25. Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S. 642, 672 (1947) (dissenting opinion).[..[T]he Court now concludes that as to Chapter X trustees Congress
implied an exception so as to allow the trustee to sge in any federal dis-
trict court in the country. If this be so, I see no escape from the conclu-
sion that not only have the federal courts jurisdiction but the State courts
no longer have it....
26. 6 CoLLima, BANKRUPTCY § 3.21 (14th ed. 1947).
27. 52 STAT. 879 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 110 (1946).
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maintain an action the day he was so appointed where the bank-
rupt could not maintain such an action the day before the re-
organization petition was approved. If the jurisdiction of the
federal court is concurrent with that of the state court, an even
greater anomaly would result if Judge Clark's dissenting opinion
were adopted: the trustee would be able to sustain his action in
a federal court because of the Bankruptcy Act, but if federal
jurisdiction were based upon diversity grounds or the cause
pursued in a state court by the bankrupt prior to reorganization
proceedings, or by the trustee following the proceedings, the
action would be dismissed.
When this is brought to light, the opinion of the court in the
principal case that the proceeding was based wholly upon a
state created claim which was not incorporated into the Bank-
ruptcy Act and was not to be construed as being a part of "pro-
ceedings in bankruptcy" for which uniformity was sought, is the
only proper and practical conclusion.
SALES-IMPLIED WARRANTY-NON-LIABILITY OF WHOLESALER
FOR UNWHOLESOME PACKAGED FOOD
Plaintiff's wife purchased some "apricot puff" cookies in their
original package from a retail grocer, who had previously bought
them from defendant, a wholesaler. In eating one of the cookies
he was injured when he swallowed a wire allegedly contained
therein. The trial court gave judgment for the plaintiff. On ap-
peal the intermediate appellate court affirmed the trial court's de-
cision and certified the question of whether the wholesaler is
directly liable to the consumer to the Texas Supreme Court. On
the first hearing, the question was answered in the affirmative,
but on a re-hearing, the question was answered in the negative,
four judges dissenting. The liability of the wholesaler is logically
contingent on that of the retailer. Since the retailer is not liable
to the consumer because he has no better knowledge of the con-
tents of the container than the consumer, the wholesaler is not
liable.1
The court in the principal case reached the same result as the
majority of courts which have considered this problem, but for a
1. Bowman Biscuit Co. of Texas v. Hines, 251 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. 1952).
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